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In 2008, Barack Obama beat the conventionally more electable candidate Hillary Clinton 
in the presidential primaries, and in the general election, he beat a more experienced and 
electable candidate John McCain (Nagourney 2008). In 2016, the deemed unelectable candidate 
Donald Trump beat his traditional primary contenders, then beat the perceived more electable 
Hillary Clinton in the general election (Flegenheimer and Barbaro 2016). Now leading up to 
2020 presidential election, the Democratic Party, voters, and the media have persistently focused 
on each candidate’s electability in the Democratic primary (Kilgore 2019).  
But what does it mean to be electable? Many pundits discuss electability in terms of how 
closely a candidate matches the perceptions of the demographic norm in swing states: a white, 
straight man with a working-class background. Some candidates and voters counter that the 
demographic view of electability is coded discrimination (Herndon 2019). Alternatively, pundits 
discuss electability by how ideologically moderate a candidate is (Kilgore 2019). Though 
demographics and moderation tend to be the most discussed methods to estimate electability, 
others estimate using a candidate’s ability to energize voters with charisma or policy, ability to 
fundraise, electoral experience and successes, portrayal in the media, or a candidate’s ability to 
debate and defend their policies. Though individual evaluations of electability are subjective, this 
paper will use the definition of electability as who voters believe will win the general election. 
While pundits may speculate about the electability of candidates, it is ultimately the 
voters’ decision. In the primaries, voters may or may not consider electability in their vote. If 
voters do consider electability, they may each determine differently who is the most electable. In 
the general election, voters determine who is electable by electing a candidate. This paper will 
explore how the relationship between perceived ideology of the candidate and perceived 
electability of the candidate: does the independent variable of a voter’s perceived ideology of a 
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candidate effect the dependent variable of the voter’s prediction of if the candidate will be 
elected? 
This paper will first look to research regarding the different criteria voters take into 
account when choosing a candidate, focusing on ideology and electability. Secondly, the paper 
will explore research regarding how voters evaluate electability, including perceptions of 
ideology, race, gender, and exposure to media. Finally, the paper will evaluate studies 
researching if voters are correct in their perceptions of candidates, in their subsequent votes, and 
their election predictions. These studies will guide my research in the perception of ideology and 
its effects on voter predictions for the 2008 and 2016 presidential elections.  
Researching voter behavior and perceptions regarding electability is essential now as our 
country is obsessed with the concept of electability, but voters, candidates, and the media greatly 
differ in defining and evaluating electability. A better understanding of perceptions of 
electability can redefine the way that candidates campaign, the media evaluates candidates, and 
voters vote. Understanding voter perceptions of electability allow us to better predict voter 
behavior and outcomes in 2020, an election in which Democrats say they will vote more on the 
ability to win in the general election over any other factor (Kilgore 2019). With that, it is 
imperative to research how voters perceive electability.  
Voter Criteria 
 When voting in a primary, do voters choose the person that most closely matches 
their ideology or the person they believe is most likely to win in the general election? Studies 
have found that voters consider the general election prospects of their party’s candidate when 
voting in primaries (Wattier 2003; Rickerhauser and Aldrich 2007; Abramowitz 1989; Stone and 
Abramowitz 1986; Adams and Merrill 2013). A common belief has been that because primary 
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voters are more ideologically extreme than the general election voters, the primary is more likely 
to produce an ideologically extreme candidate that is less ideologically similar to the general 
population (Stone and Abramowtiz 1986; Abramowitz 1989). Abramowitz in his 1986 research 
with Stone and in his 1989 research uses voter decision pathways to model voter behavior, 
displaying that personal opinions of the candidate affect the voter’s perception of which 
candidate is most likely to win the general election. Though voters consider the electability of the 
candidate, Adams and Merrill (2013) found using election modeling that voting with ideology or 
voting with electability had an equal effect on election outcomes. Data does not support the 
bandwagon method of voting, in which voters support a candidate because they believe the 
candidate will win the primary election, as voters think more about winners of the general 
election than the primary (Abramowitz 1989). Some studies found electability to be the strongest 
indicator of voter choice (Wattier 2003; Abramowitz and Stone 1986) while other studies found 
that voters combined substantive issues as well as electability in their decision (Rickerharuser 
and Aldrich 2007; Adams and Merrill 2013). Though studies vary in the degree to which voters 
consider electability, all relevant research has supported that electability is an important indicator 
for voter primary choice.  
Voter Perception of Electability 
 Voters who vote with a consideration of electability must then use a variety of 
factors to decide who they perceive to be most likely to win in the general election, including 
perceived ideology of the candidate (Simas 2016; Cremona and McDonald 2006; Stone and 
Abramowitz 1986; Abramowitz 1989; Stone and Rapoport 1994; Hall 2015), race and gender of 
the candidate and voter (Terkildsen 1993; Weaver 2012; Payne 2011; Stout and Danvy 2010; 
Sanbonmatsu 2006; Smith et al 2018; Miller, Peaker, and Boulton 2010; Atkeson and Krebs 
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2008), and the media portrayal of the candidate (Simas 2016; Stone and Rapoport 1994; Miller, 
Peake, and Boulton 2010; Atkeson and Krebs 2008).  
The term “moderation hypothesis” is used to describe the concept that more moderate 
candidates are more likely to win the general election. Studies have found that voters follow the 
moderation hypothesis to some extent, with a modest effect of perceived ideology on perceptions 
of which primary candidate voters think will win the general election (Abramowitz and Stone 
1989; Rapoport and Stone 1994). However, the effects are limited with ideologically extreme 
candidates able to outperform moderate candidates (Simas 2016 and Stone and Rapoport 1994). 
Cremona and McDonald (2006) found no relationship between centrist party position and 
electability of the candidate and party using data from left-right two-party systems including the 
UK, Australia, US, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand. This discrepancy in results may be 
because the United States is the only system with a non-plurality system, and candidate-centered 
elections can greatly change the behavior of voters. Contrarily, Hall (2015) found a strong 
relationship between moderation and election chances, with an average decrease in election 
success of 9-13% for ideologically extreme candidates. This conclusion may find a strong 
relationship between moderation and electability compared to those of Simas, Stone and 
Rapoport, and Abramowitz because Hall used data from House races while the other studies used 
national presidential election data: individual districts may be more sensitive to ideological 
extremity than the entire country. Furthermore, voters perceive candidates’ ideologies 
differently: Republicans perceive Democratic candidates to be more liberal than Democrats 
perceive Democratic candidates, and Democrats perceive Republican candidates to be more 
conservative than Republicans perceive Republican candidates (Stone and Rapoport 1994). For 
that reason, it will be important in this research to control for the party of the voter respondents. 
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Overall, the ideological extremity does have an effect on voter perceptions of electability, but 
there are limiting factors to the relationship such as candidate television performances and 
ideological variations from the voters, and the effects change with the type of election. 
However, voters do not perceive ideology alone in their evaluations of electability. The 
race and gender of candidates can consciously or subconsciously affect voters' perceptions. 
Studies have found that the candidates who are black receive lower rankings from voters and less 
likelihood of voter support, decreasing their electability (Terkildsen 1993; Weaver 2012; Payne 
2011; Stout and Danvy 2010). In hypothetical comparisons of white and black candidates, white 
voters would penalize black candidates controlling for policies and parties (Terkildsen 1993; 
Weaver 2012). In a comparison of real candidates in real elections, there are negative effects 
among voters for black candidates (Payne 2011; Stout and Danvy 2010). There was a gap 
between black and white candidates, even when controlling for party, in the 2008 Presidential 
election with Obama and Clinton (Stout and Danvy 2010) and Tom Bradley’s California 
gubernatorial race (Payne 2011). Additionally, the race, gender, and party of the voter all affect 
how the voter perceives race in their evaluation of the candidate, with black voters (Weaver 
2012; Payne 2011; Stout and Danvy 2010). Studies looking at skin tone found that skin tone also 
affected voter behavior and thinking (Stout and Danvey 2010; Terkildsen 1993), with Terkildsen 
finding that voters evaluating candidates with darker skin tones are more likely to be aware of 
their prejudice. While the personal opinion of a candidate can affect the perception of 
electability, these studies did not research the effects of race of candidates on the perceptions of 
their electability.  
The gender of the candidate can also affect the perception of voters of the candidate. 
Women candidates are perceived differently than men in their elections (Sanbonmatsu 2006; 
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Smith et al 2018; Miller, Peaker, and Boulton 2010; Atkeson and Krebs 2008). Perceptions of 
electability have had consistent correlations with gender, with sexualized appearance negatively 
affecting voter perceptions of electability (Smith et al 2018), questions of electability positively 
correlated with questions of electability in newspapers (Miller, Peaker, and Boulton 2010), and 
party leaders believing women have worse electoral chances (Sanbonmatsu 2006). When 
comparing their election outcomes, women generally perform no worse than men, especially 
among Democratic districts (Sanbonmatsu 2006; Ondercin and Welch 2009).  
For moderation, race, and gender, the media’s amount of coverage and type of coverage 
can also affect a candidate’s election prospects (Simas 2016; Stone and Rapoport 1994; Miller, 
Peake, and Boulton 2010; Atkeson and Krebs 2008). Simas and Stone and Rapoport found media 
to be an intervening variable and controlled for its effects when testing the effects of ideology on 
perceived electability. Stone and Rapoport found the television performance of Reagan and John 
Glenn to exceed past the moderation hypothesis. Gender affects the type of media coverage in a 
race, which can greatly affect voter perception of candidates (Atkeson and Krebs 2008; Miller, 
Peake, and Boulton 2010). Atkeson and Krebs found in open-seat nonpartisan competitive 
mayoral races that press coverage was not biased in favor of male candidates but only expanded 
the issues discussed in campaigns, contrasting with Miller, Peake, and Boulton that concluded 
that female candidates received more negative coverage and more negative personal coverage 
than men in looking at the 2008 election with Obama and Clinton. This discrepancy could be due 
to the different political environments of local elections and national elections, as national 
elections are often more animus.  
Accuracy of Voter Predictions and Perceptions 
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 How accurate are voters in their perceptions of electability in who will win the 
election, and does their voting choice reflect their values? Voters as an aggregate have been able 
to successfully predict who will win the presidential election for many election cycles (Lewis-
Beck and Tien 1999; Forsythe et al 1992). Though many voters are biased in their decision of 
who they believe will win the election, there are enough voters limited in their bias that their 
combined prediction overall can outperform predictions based on voter preference polling 
(Lewis-Beck and Tien 1999; Forsythe et al 1992). Lewis-Beck and Tien also found that voter 
predictions could predict election outcomes more accurately a month before the election date 
than traditional polling. However, even if voters can accurately predict election winners, their 
vote choice may not reflect their individual values and interests, especially in primaries (Lau 
2013). Lau found that in primaries, voters often barely do better than chance in selecting a 
candidate that represents their values. Voters may be able as a group to predict who can win an 
election but cannot predict who they best align within primaries. This indicates that despite 
biases and wishful thinking, voters collectively can determine electability which is important as 
voters do use electability in their primary decisions.  
Causal Explanations and Hypotheses 
Voters may perceive that more moderate candidates are more electable based on their 
thoughts about other voters and what candidates need to do to win an election. Voters think that 
for a candidate to win an election, the candidate must appeal to a wide array of voters. With that, 
the candidate cannot appeal only to their party, but to the swing and independent voters that 
decide the election. Voters see candidates that are more ideologically extreme as less appealing 
for more moderate voters and the general electorate, so they are less likely to gain their votes and 
are less likely to win. Voters think that extreme candidates have fewer people that are 
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ideologically consistent with them, so the candidates will have a far narrower base and the 
number of voters. Furthermore, voters see that ideologically extreme issue positions are often 
used as attack points on candidates, so the more extreme the candidate is, it is harder for them to 
defend their positions and defend themselves against an opposition candidate making them less 
likely to win. 
Voters may believe that there are fewer moderate voters or swing voters than there are 
extreme voters, so a candidate must be moderate to get the most votes. Alternatively, voters 
could assume that moderates would not vote for an ideologically extreme candidate, but 
ideologically extreme voters would vote for a more moderate candidate. That could be because 
extreme voters are more politically engaged and would rather vote for someone they don’t 
ideologically match with than have the oppositional party win. In this study, I hypothesize that in 
a comparison of individuals, respondents who perceive a candidate to be more moderate in their 
party are more likely to believe that candidate will be elected. With that, I hypothesize that in a 
comparison of individuals, respondents who perceive the Democratic candidate to be more 
conservative are more likely to believe that that candidate will win than those who believe the 
candidate is more liberal, and that respondents who perceive the Republican candidate to be 
more liberal are more likely to believe that that candidate will win than those who perceive the 
Republican candidate to be conservative.   
I will control for the respondent’s ideology, race, and gender. I control for party ideology 
as an individual’s ideology can affect how they perceive a candidate’s ideology. If an individual 
is extremely liberal, they may perceive a liberal candidate to be moderate, as the candidate is 
moderate relative to themselves, and the same follows for conservative individuals. I control for 
the respondent’s gender as in both elections, females may assess electability differently than 
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males and in 2016, females may perceive Clinton as a female candidate to be more electable than 
males may perceive her to be. Finally, I control for race as racial issues were central in the 2008 
and 2016 election which could affect the way voters of different races predict the outcome of the 
election.  
Research Design Section 
Introduction 
In order to test the hypotheses, I examined data from the American National Election 
Surveys 2008 and 2016. The data include a pre and post-election survey with 2,322 respondents 
for 2008 and 4,270 respondents for 2016. All respondents were US eligible voters. I will be 
using only data from pre-election survey.  
I selected these data because I am researching perceived ideology and electability in 
American presidential elections. These surveys asked respondents both how they perceived each 
major candidate’s ideology and who they thought would win, or in other words, who is most 
electable. Furthermore, I selected 2008 and 2016 because I wanted to look at presidential 
elections in which there is an open seat, as a candidate’s incumbency can impact voters’ 
predictions and perceptions of electability. Furthermore, many similar studies that have 
researched ideologically and electability are from the 1980s, and modern data would be the most 
relevant. I use only pre-election surveys as I am looking at who voters think will win the 
election, so the surveys must be from before the election occurs. A constraint of these surveys is 
that they only survey respondents before and after the general election, and do not include 
information about candidate perception of ideology or win predictions from the primary 
elections. 
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Variable Measurements 
In order to operationalize perceived electability of the presidential candidate, I use the 
win prediction variable. The survey question asked to respondents was, “Who do you think will 
be elected President in November?” with “Barack Obama,” “John McCain,” and “Other” for 
2008 and “Hillary Clinton,” “Donald Trump,” and “Other” for 2016. Those who answered 
“Other” were removed from the data. The mode for this variable in 2008 was Barack Obama, 
with 71.94% of respondents predicting Obama. In 2016, the mode was Hillary Clinton, with 
64.41% of respondents predicting Hillary Clinton. In Table 1 and Table 2, there is a distribution 
of respondents who believe each candidate will win by the party of the voter. In Table 1, it is 
clear that while a majority of respondents overall believed that Obama would be elected, a much 
higher percentage of Democrats believed so compared to Independents and Republicans. The 
same pattern follows for Clinton in 2016, as seen in Table 2.   
Table 1: 2008 Respondent’s Predictions of Who Will Be Elected by Respondent’s Party 
Who voters believe will be elected 
Respondents Self-Identified Party 
Democrat Independent Republican Total 
John McCain 12.51 29.36 61.70 28.06 
Barack Obama 87.49 70.64 38.30 71.94 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 2: 2016 Respondent’s Predictions of Who Will Be Elected by Respondent’s Party 
Who voters believe will be elected 
Respondents Self-Identified Party 
Democrat Independent Republican Total 
Donald Trump 9.30 36.11 66.18 35.47 
Hillary Clinton 90.70 63.89 33.82 64.53 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Respondents’ perceived ideology of the Democratic candidate was surveyed with the 
question, “Where would you place [Barack Obama/ Hillary Clinton] on this scale?” with the 
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scale ranging from 1-7. The scale was labeled as follows: “1. Extremely liberal 2. Liberal 3. 
Slightly liberal 4. Moderate; middle of the road 5. Slightly conservative 6. Conservative 7. 
Extremely conservative.” The mean of Barack Obama’s perceived ideology is 3.29; the median 
is 3 for slightly liberal; the mode is 2 for liberal. The mean of Hillary Clinton’s perceived 
ideology is 2.73; the median is 2 for Liberal; the mode is also 2 for Liberal. Figures 1 and 2 
display the percentage of the sample who believe the Democratic candidate will win by the 
respondents’ perceived ideology of the candidate, for Obama and Clinton respectively. 
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
W
h
o
 B
e
lie
v
e
 O
b
a
m
a
 W
ill
 W
in
Ex
trm
e.
 L
ib
.
Li
be
ra
l
Sl
ig
ht
ly 
Li
b.
M
od
er
at
e
Sl
ig
ht
ly 
Co
n.
Co
ns
er
va
tiv
e
Ex
trm
. C
on
.
Respondent's Perceived Ideology of Obama
Figure 1: Percent Who Believe Obama will Win
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Respondents’ perceived ideology of John McCain and Donald Trump was surveyed with 
the same question replacing the candidates’ names and using the same scale. For the perceived 
ideology of John McCain, the mean is 4.86; the median is 5 for slightly conservative; the mode is 
6 for conservative. The mean of Donald Trump’s perceived ideology is 4.87; the median is 5 for 
slightly conservative; the mode is 6 for conservative. Figures 3 and 4 display the percentage of 
the sample who believe the Republican candidate will win by the respondents’ perceived 
ideology of the candidate, for McCain and Trump respectively.  
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Figure 2: Percent Who Believe Clinton will Win
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In the survey, the respondent’s gender was recorded by asking “What is your gender?” 
with the options “Male,” “Female,” and “Other.” The responses are coded with male as the value 
1, females as the value 2, and those who responded other removed from the data. The mode of 
this variable is female, with 57.0% female respondents in 2008 and 52.9% female respondents in 
2016.  
Race was recorded by asking the question “Please choose one or more races that you consider 
yourself to be:  white, black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, or Native 
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander?” If the respondent identified as Hispanic, they were recorded under a 
Hispanic category, with all other race categories specifically non-Hispanic. If the respondent identified as 
a race not listed or listed more than one race, they were considered as part of a sixth “Other” category. 
The mode of the variable is white non-Hispanic for both years, with 62.40% of respondents in 2008 
71.68% of respondents in 2016.  
Model Estimation 
 The dependent variable, who respondents believed would be elected, is a binary variable, 
which is why I chose logistic regression to approximate the probability of a voter believing that 
the Democratic or Republican candidate would win. I ran four logistic regressions, one each for 
Obama, Clinton, McCain, and Trump, to estimate the probabilities of a voter believing that each 
candidate would win the election, with the independent variable as what the voter perceived the 
candidate’s ideology to be. In both models, I controlled for the ideology of the voter, race, and 
gender. The ideology of the voter is interval, so I held the ideology at its mean, which was 4.14 
in 2008 and 4.18 in 2016 on the 7-point scale from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. 
Race and gender are nominal variables, so I held each variable at their modes. In 2008 and 2016, 
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the mode for race was non-Hispanic white people (race6 = 1). For gender, the mode is female 
(gender = 2) in both years.  
Results 
Model 1: Probability that Respondent Believes Obama Will Win 
Table 3: 2008 Logistic Regression for 
Probability Voters Believe  Obama Will Win 
Variables winprediction 
  
Perceived Obama ideology 0.346*** 
 (0.0407) 
Race 0.133* 
 (0.0701) 
Respondent ideology -0.443*** 
 (0.0428) 
Gender -0.0541 
 (0.126) 
Constant 1.621*** 
 (0.317) 
Observations 1,419 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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This model supports that the more conservative the respondent to perceive Obama’s 
ideology to be, the more likely the respondent is to predict that Obama will be elected. The p-
value is less than 0.01 for the perceived ideology independent variable, meaning that we reject 
the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis: the more conservative the voter 
perceives Obama to be, the higher the probability that they believe he will win. The effect of 
gender was not significant with a p-value above 0.1. Race was significant at the p<0.1 level and 
respondent ideology is significant with a p-value below 0.01. Respondent ideology has the 
greatest effect on the respondent’s outcome prediction, with a -0.443 coefficient. While the 
confidence intervals in the graph overlap between extremely liberal and liberal or conservative 
and slightly conservative, the increase is significant when comparing a wider ideological spread, 
including from extremely liberal to slightly liberal, and from slightly liberal to slightly 
conservative. The R-squared value is 0.131: about 13 percent of the variation in the dependent 
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variable (the win prediction) is explained by the independent variables. The other 87 percent of 
the variation may be explained by other variables not included in the regression equation. 
Overall, this model supports the hypothesis that in a comparison of individuals, the more 
conservative a Democratic candidate is perceived to be, the more likely they are to be predicted 
to win by voters.  
Model 2: Probability that Respondent Believes Clinton Will Win 
Table 4: 2016 Logistic Regression for 
Probability Voters Believe Clinton Will Win 
Variables winprediction 
  
Perceived Clinton ideology 0.189*** 
 (0.0346) 
Race 0.108*** 
 (0.0316) 
Respondent ideology -0.765*** 
 (0.0360) 
Gender 0.137 
 (0.0894) 
Constant 3.226*** 
 (0.256) 
Observations 3,066 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 This model supports that the more conservative the respondent to perceive Clinton’s 
ideology to be, the more likely the respondent is to predict that Clinton will be elected. The p-
value is less than 0.01 for the perceived ideology independent variable, meaning that we reject 
the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis: the more conservative the voter 
perceives Clinton to be, the higher the probability that they believe she will win. The coefficient 
for perceived ideology was .189, which is lower than the coefficient for Obama (.346) but is still 
a meaningful increase on a scale from 0 to 1. The effect of gender on voter prediction was not 
significant, with a p-value above 0.1. Race and respondent ideology are significant with p-values 
below 0.01. Respondent ideology has the greatest effect on the respondent’s outcome prediction, 
with a -0.765 coefficient. Like in the graph for logistic regression for Obama, the confidence 
intervals in the graph overlap between extremely liberal and liberal or conservative and slightly 
conservative but is significant when comparing a larger ideological spread: including from 
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extremely liberal to slightly liberal. The differences are not significant from those who perceive 
Clinton is slightly conservative to those who perceive Clinton is extremely conservative, partly 
because the error bars are larger for those who perceive her to be conservative because fewer 
voters perceive Clinton to be ideologically conservative than those who believe her to be 
ideologically liberal. The R-squared value is 0.228: about 23 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable (prediction that Clinton will win) is explained by the independent variables. 
The other 77 percent of the variation may be explained by other variables not included in the 
regression equation. Overall, this model supports the hypothesis that in a comparison of 
individuals, the more conservative a Democratic candidate is perceived to be, the more likely 
they are to be predicted to win by voters.  
Model 3: Probability that a Respondent Believes that McCain Will Win 
Table 9: 2008 Logistic Regression for 
Probability Voters Believe McCain Will Win 
Variables winprediction 
  
perceived McCain ideology 0.155*** 
 (0.0419) 
Race -0.256*** 
 (0.0690) 
respondent ideology 0.463*** 
 (0.0427) 
Gender 0.0203 
 (0.122) 
Constant -3.220*** 
 (0.390) 
  
Observations 1,419 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In the model for probability that a respondent believes McCain will win, the respondent’s 
perceived ideology of McCain has an effect, though less sizeable than for Clinton and Obama, 
with a 0.155 compared to 0.189 and 0.346 respectively. However, in this model, the more 
conservative McCain is perceived to be, the more respondents predicted he would win this is the 
opposite of the hypothesis for Republican candidates. I hypothesized that those who perceived 
him to be more conservative would have a lower probability of believing that he would win with 
a negative coefficient, but the coefficient is positive, indicating the opposite. Perceived ideology 
in this model is significant at the p<0.01 level. When comparing the confidence intervals in this 
model, the differences in ideology are only significant when comparing those who perceive 
McCain to be extremely liberal and extremely conservative. The R-Squared for this model is 
0.0925: about 9 percent of the variation in the dependent variable (prediction of if McCain will 
win) is explained by the independent variables. The other 91 percent of the variation may be 
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Figure 7: 2008 Probability One Believes McCain will Win
by Perceived ideology
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explained by other variables not included in the regression equation.  Though this model is 
significant when looking at the p-value, the effects of perceived ideology on voter prediction are 
limited when comparing the confidence intervals and the small coefficient.  
Model 4: Probability that a Respondent Believes that Trump Will Win 
Table 10: Logistic Regression for 
Probability Voters Believe Trump Will Win 
 (1) 
Variables winprediction 
  
perceived Trump ideology -0.0200 
 (0.0276) 
Race -0.140*** 
 (0.0313) 
respondent ideology 0.825*** 
 (0.0348) 
Gender -0.166* 
 (0.0889) 
Constant -3.740*** 
 (0.272) 
  
Observations 3,029 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 In the model for probability that a respondent believes Trump will win, the respondent’s 
perceived ideology of Trump has a much smaller effect than in the model for Clinton. The 
coefficient is -0.02, which while still negative, has little effect in the regression, while respondent 
ideology still has the highest coefficient at 0.825. Additionally, for this Trump model, the 
perceived ideology of Trump is p-level is 0.467, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis and 
cannot conclude that the perceived ideology of Trump has an effect on voter belief that he will 
win. Furthermore, all confidence intervals overlap. However, race, respondent ideology, and 
gender are statistically significant in this model as well, though gender is only significant at the 
p<0.1 level. With an R-squared value of 0.219, about 22 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable (prediction of if Trump will win) is explained by the independent variables. The other 
78 percent of the variation may be explained by other variables not included in the regression 
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equation.  For the Trump model, there is no evidence to support that the more liberal a 
Republican candidate is perceived to be, the more likely voters will be to believe they will win.  
Discussions and Conclusions 
 Overall, the perception of a candidate’s ideology only had a moderate effect on who 
respondents believed would win for the Democratic candidates, Obama and Clinton: the more 
conservative the respondent perceived the Democratic candidates to be, the higher probability 
that the respondent will believe the candidate will win. McCain’s results were only significant 
when comparing the perceived ideological extremes, and the relationship was the opposite of the 
hypothesis, with probability of believing McCain would win increasing as the perceived 
conservatism increases. The results for the 2016 Trump model were not significant when 
comparing confidence intervals nor when evaluating p-value. The data from 2008 and 2016 
suggest that the perceived ideology of the presidential candidate affect voter’s prediction of who 
will in for Democratic candidates more than Republican candidates.  
 My findings for Clinton and Obama are in line with existing literature, specifically with 
Stone and Abramowitz (1986), who found a correlation between moderation and Stone and 
Rapoport (1994). However, no study I looked at found a discrepancy between Republican 
presidential candidates and Democratic presidential candidates. This party disparity could exist 
because Republican voters are more willing to vote for someone who does not match perfectly 
ideologically than Democrats are, so voters could think extreme ideology in the Democratic 
party will have more effect than ideological extremity in the Republican Party. Stone and 
Rapoport (1994) also found that performance on television could overpower the effects of 
ideological moderation, which could be another reason that the model for Trump had the least 
correlation between perceived ideology and predictions of his win, as Donald Trump had a 
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prominent media presence. To continue this research, I would look at more election years to see 
if the difference in variable effect for Democrats and Republicans is an ongoing pattern. If it is a 
consistent pattern, I would research why the difference exists. In addition, I would like to 
compare candidates of the same party during primaries to see the effects of perceived ideology 
on perceived electability. In addition, it would be interesting to look at different data from more 
types of elections, including U.S. House and Senate races, and races for state government as 
well.  
 As the Democratic Party still fields 18 presidential candidates with a wide ideological 
spread, the party and campaigns want to find ways to sell candidates to voters as the most likely 
to win in the general election. Gaining a deeper understanding of how voters perceive 
candidates’ ideologies and their corresponding electoral chances can be valuable for those trying 
to win elections and those trying to study elections.  
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